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THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA: 
SEPARATION – OR A WAY TO PREVENT ‘ALL SEPARATION’?
The cohesion of the House of Habsburg was a salient feature of 17th century
politics. In Philipp II’s era, relations with both his brother-in-law Maximilian
and his nephew Rudolph had been notably lacking in warmth. When the Dutch
rebellion erupted, the Emperor withdrew into what was at best benevolent
neutrality. After 1619 all that changed – the Styrian cadet branch that took over
was willing to acknowledge the senior position of its Madrid cousins. For many,
then and now, Spanish influence (or the so-called “Spanish party” at the Vienna
Court) was synonymous with religious intransigence. That may have been true
in 1618, but in the long run there was a curious dialectic at work: Ferdinand II
had to rely on Spanish help because he was challenged by the Protestants; but
because he had to rely on Spain, the war that ensued turned from a conflict
with strong religious overtones to a war of hegemony, with France as the
“fountain of all evil”, and at least some of the Protestants increasingly seen as
potential allies. 
Coalition warfare is hardly ever free from tensions; especially when one of
the two partners is clearly in the position of the junior partner. Tensions there
were within the Habsburg “family compact”; but the basic solidarity was never
called into question. During the later stages of the Thirty Years War, the
conflict almost assumed the character of one family fighting against the rest of
the world. It needed the combined power of France, Sweden and the Dutch
Republic, with their very different types of strength, to fight the Habsburgs to
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a standstill, and gain a certain degree of preponderance during the 1640’s, after
the Catalan segadors and the “tyrant” of Portugal had joined them. 
Moreover, the assumption of Habsburg solidarity was probably one of the
factors that made peace-making more difficult: The anti-Habsburg alliance might
have been on its way to winning the war; but its members were afraid they were
going to lose the peace. The anti-Habsburg alliance was a child of circumstance;
once their partnership was dissolved, they would not meet again – and they knew
it. They had differing priorities: Even before 1648, the Dutch had fought the
Portuguese in Brazil and the Swedes the Danes in the Baltic, rather than
coordinate and concentrate their efforts against the Habsburgs. But the
Habsburgs would fight another day – and deal with their enemies separately,
unless a formula could be found to prevent that backlash. “Spanish decadence”,
whether reality or myth, was not something politicians were willing to take for
granted in 1648 1.
For the Habsburgs on the other hand, that degree of family solidarity was
not just a foreign policy move, let alone a matter of sentiment; it gained its
imperative character from the ever-present danger that one of them might die
without male heirs. In such an eventuality, you had to be close enough to each
other to prevent a hostile takeover. The German branch had come to rely on
Spanish help to about the same extent Sweden relied on French subsidies.
Dreams of grandeur apart, it simply could not afford to let the Spanish
inheritance fall into different –and thus indifferent– hands. After all, it was
only a combination of Turkish collapse and Anglo-Dutch money instead of the
silver fleet that contrived to keep the German Habsburgs in the running for the
first few decades after 1700.
The dreaded dynastic “window of vulnerability” opened with the death of
Philip IV’s heir, Balthasar Carlos, in October, 1646 that left his eight-year old
sister Maria Teresa as the sole heiress of an Empire that spanned half the world.
The looming threat was summed up by a loyal and acute observer: “God forbid
the king should die before peace is concluded and ere the infanta is married” 2.
Apart from the Emperor’s two sons, Ferdinand IV (born in 1633) and Leopold
Ignaz (born in 1640), there simply were no safe contenders for the Spanish
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crown – unless you counted either Leopold Wilhelm, the Emperor’s younger
brother (even though, he happened to be a man of the Church) or as a last resort
the Tyrolean branch of the family: Archdukes Ferdinand Karl and Sigismund, the
sons of Claudia de Medici – a prospect that was viewed with misgivings by
the Vienna court, however. (As a sort of consolation price, Ferdinand III married
a Tyrolean archduchess as his second wife in 1648.) 
The ancient motto, associated with the rise of the Habsburg dynasty to
European prominence, had of course, always been: “Tu, felix Austria, nube!” The
misleading part of that verse had always been the line before: “Bella gerant alii”.
The Habsburg experience did not lend itself to a Beatles-style summing-up of
“Make love not war”. On the contrary, starting with the Burgundian match
of 1477 that unleashed their antagonism with France, the Habsburgs had usually
been forced to fight for their inheritance. That remained true in 1646, too – the
only difference was: In the old days marriage had come first, wars later. Now
the order was reversed. The Emperor had to continue fighting at Spain’s side if
he wanted one of his sons to be rewarded with the Infanta’s hand.
The autumn of 1646 thus witnessed a tightening of dynastic bonds:
Balthasar Carlos had been engaged to be married to the Emperor’s daughter
Maria Ana; in a surprise move, Philipp IV decided to enter into that marriage
contract himself. A few weeks earlier, in September 1646, he had offered the
governorship of the Netherlands to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm. While their
advisors were still working out the details of the Archduke’s commission,
Peñaranda managed to clinch the deal with the Dutch and sign an armistice in
January, 1647: Once he arrived in Brussels, Leopold Wilhelm would no longer
be faced with a war on two fronts 3. 
The truce with the Dutch gave hard-liners the upper hand: To Peñaranda’s
dismay, Count Maximilian Trauttmansdorff, Ferdinand III’s chief minister,
had come close to settling the Emperor’s disputes with both France and
Sweden in 1646. A split had opened between the policy of the two Habsburg
Courts, or at least between their representatives in Münster. Yet, family
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solidarity called for a continuation of the war – unless Spain was willing to sign
the peace treaty, too, the Emperor would not dare offend his Spanish cousins at
such a critical juncture by parting ways with Madrid. In the summer of 1648
Philipp IV and Haro even suggested the Emperor should withdraw his
plenipotentiaries from Münster altogether. The money saved, it was argued,
could better be spent by raising new regiments 4. 
There might well have been no Westphalian peace if it had not been for
another series of Swedish successes. The elite of the Vienna court was heavily hit
when the Swedes surprised Prague and captured a number of their relatives, in
July, 1648. Ferdinand was compelled to stop fighting, after all, for fear of further
losses. The news of the Westphalian treaty arrived at a crucial moment, just as
Philip IV’s bride Maria Ana, now thirteen-and-a-half, was about to leave Vienna,
with her elder brother Ferdinand eager to come along and establish himself as
the heir apparent of the Spanish monarchy. The invitation extended to young
Ferdinand (IV) had always been a half-hearted one even at the best of times:
Madrid did want to retain the option of marrying the Infanta to a French prince,
just in case. Even worse, in case the Emperor signed the peace, both the Spanish
ambassadors in Vienna –Terranova, who was leaving, and Lumiares, who had
just arrived– had strict instructions to prevent Ferdinand’s journey. At most,
Ferdinand IV might have been allowed to accompany his sister across the
Mediterranean but would have to turn back after a meeting with Philip IV in a
port town, e.g. Malaga.
Madrid regarded the Westphalian treaty as a separation, a breach of trust, as
the treaty expressly forbade the Emperor to support Spain any longer in its war
with France. When he received the hapless Imperial ambassador, Caretto, Philip
IV pretended he could not even believe the news of his cousin’s desertion, at
first. Ferdinand III, of course, tried to put things in a more favourable light: As
he was unable to help his cousins right now, with the enemy at the gate, Spain
had not lost anything materially; on the other hand, as soon as his position
improved, he hinted, he could just as easily circumvent the neutrality clauses by
donning another crown and offering help in his capacity as King of Hungary.
Thus, he argued, as the peace was the shortest way to a recovery of Habsburg
fortunes, it did not spell separation, but a way to prevent ‘all separation’ 5.
1424
Lothar Höbelt
4       HHStA, Spanien 35, folder 593, fols. 157-169, Caretto 29 July 1648.
5       L. HÖBELT: Ferdinand III. Friedenskaiser wider Willen, Graz 2008, pp. 288-291.
III.12 Hobelt_Maquetación 1  04/05/11  13:05  Página 1424
MARRIAGE PROPOSALS AT CROSS-PURPOSES
That tacit ‘agreement to differ’ is where matters rested for a surprisingly
long period of almost five years: First of all, any definite decision about the
infanta’s marriage could easily be postponed until she had reached an age of
roughly fifteen. In the meantime, if the new Queen of Spain produced an heir,
the matter would lose much of its urgency. (As it happened, Maria Ana gave
birth to Margarita Teresa in 1651; she was much criticised for suffering a
miscarriage allegedly brought on by too active a life in August 1653 6; another
daughter, born in December 1655, died after only a few weeks.) Secondly, thanks
to the “Fronde”, the civil war in France, Spain did not need any extra help from
the Emperor. 1652, in particular, proved to be an even more impressive annus
mirabilis than 1625 (even if no equivalent cycle of paintings was commissioned
to commemorate that year). Barcelona and Casale were taken; even more
flamboyantly, the Duke of Lorraine staged a joyeuse entrée into Paris; not to
forget the exploits of the British Commonwealth fleet that counted as a non-too-
secret ally and helped Leopold Wilhelm reconquer Dunkirk 7.
In the meantime, Ferdinand III finally got rid of the Swedes who lived off
his lands in 1650 8 and leisurely prepared for an imperial diet that was supposed
to tie up a few loose ends. In the run up to the diet, on 31 May 1653, his son
was also elected King of the Romans 9. Ferdinand IV had now passed his 20th
birthday; he was a king three times over (including the crowns of Hungary and
Bohemia). It was time for the matchmakers to get busy again. In November
1653 the emperor raised the matter again in a letter to Philip IV. Rather
disingenuously, he was careful to put the marriage proposal in purely domestic
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terms. The Infanta simply happened to be the most suitable partner for a King
of the Romans: “allein damit der römische König seinem stand gemäß sein gemahl
bekommen möge” 10. Yet, there was an element of truth in his plea. Ferdinand IV
needed a wife. With the relentless ticking of the biological clock for such an
incestuous dynasty, it was surely better to try and start producing heirs in both
Vienna and Madrid as soon as possible: “das beste mittel der vernunft nach…daß
man auf zweien orthen der succession oblige” 11.
Foremost among the potential matchmakers ranked the new ‘prime
minister’ at the Vienna Court, Prince Weikhard Auersperg who held the
position of mayordomo or Lord High Steward not of the Emperor, but of
the young king. Auersperg hankered after his predecessor Trauttmansdorff ’s
reputation as the real power behind the throne but did not enjoy such an
unrivalled position, politically; nor did he have Trauttmansdorff ’s easy humour
or his nonchalance. If anything, though, he was even more pro-Spanish than
Trauttmansdorff who had often fought with Peñaranda in his last years. For the
first few years of his ascendancy, Auersperg’s closest ally at the Court of Vienna
was the Spanish ambassador Francisco de Moura, Conde de Lumiares, who
inherited his father’s title as Marquess of Castel-Rodrigo in 1651 12.
The matchmakers faced two difficulties: One was the Vienna branch had
done very little to earn the hand of the infanta by its behaviour over the last five
years: True, they had transferred two of their surplus regiments into Spanish
service by disbanding them so close to the Milanese border that soldiers had
little choice 13. But as long as Ferdinand III needed the electors’ votes for his
son’s election, he had to take their sensibilities into account and could not
openly flaunt his disregard of the Westphalian neutrality clauses. Thus, Count
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Johann Maximilian Lamberg, the new Imperial ambassador who arrived in
Madrid in early 1653, probably rightly suspected that resentment at Vienna’s
“desertion” in 1648 still lingered in Spain where “etliche biß auf diße stund die
exclusion Regis Hispaniae vom Münsterischen friden nit verkocht oder verschmerzt
haben” 14. As a quid pro quo, any marriage proposal that wanted to be taken
seriously, obviously had to include a tacit promise, at least, to improve the
political and military cooperation between Vienna and Madrid. 
On top of those atmospheric difficulties, both Auersperg and Lamberg also
sensed a structural difficulty: If the marriage of Ferdinand IV and the infanta
Maria Teresa went ahead, the couple might easily find itself in possession of
Charles V’s ‘monarchia universalis’. Now, Germans might associate the golden
days of Charles V with Titian’s painting of Charles triumphantly riding over the
battlefields of Europe; Spanish memories of the man who for them was Carlos
I were less happy, as Lamberg reminded his patrons: No one in Spain was keen
to revive Charles V’s monarchy and reduce Spain to an appendix of the Holy
Roman Empire: “Man habe hier noch in frischem gedächtnuß, was für inconvenienzen
tempore Caroli quinti entstanden” 15. 
The Spanish Empire was a composite monarchy at least as much as the
German and Hungarian holdings of the dynasty, with even more far flung
possessions. Yet, it seems that in Castile, at least, there was a sense of statehood
as distinct from dynastic interests that was totally lacking in the German lands.
Maybe it was a polite excuse if Philip IV sometimes argued his ministers would
not let him do certain things; but if so, it was a argument that seemed plausible
enough to Lamberg. He feared the Spanish ministers wanted to delay the match
as long as possible because once the king was dead, they would be able to do as
they pleased and exclude the Vienna branch from the Spanish inheritance
completely. As an alternative, they might work for a Portuguese marriage to
reintegrate the Iberian kingdoms, or co-opt a Savoyan prince to push the French
out of Italy; if it came to the worst the inheritance might simply be partitioned.
As a stop-gap solution, Lamberg also feared that Spain might proclaim Juan
Jose, Philip IV’s legalized bastard son, regent, if not king in his own name 16. He
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added, those ideas did not correspond to the thoughts of the king, maybe also
not the plans of Don Luis de Haro but then he had no great opinion of the
independence of mind of a man like Haro, who had never been abroad and never
sat in a council 17. As a result, the valido “magis timet quam timeatur” 18.
The uncertain prospects of the succession first of all meant that Spain was
unwilling to let its heiress leave the country. If anything was to come of the
proposal, it was Ferdinand IV who would have to transfer his residence to
Madrid. Even so, when Ferdinand insisted, Philipp IV finally replied on 13 June
1654 that he was unable to answer conclusively: He did not intend to overlook
the claims of “our house”; he would make the appropriate preparations for the
marriage (like asking for a Papal dispensation) but could not yet commit himself.
Philip had tried to make his refusal as palatable as possible. His ambassador
Castel-Rodrigo was blunter. When asked by Auersperg during the carnival
season of 1654, he poured cold water on all these projects. After all, Spain was
no vassal of the house of Austria. They would “marry the infanta to win land and
people”. Such openness did not make him popular with Auersperg 19. Their
friendship was abruptly terminated. The axis, around which court life at Vienna
had revolved, suddenly broke in two.
As a way out, Lamberg suggested Ferdinand’s second born son Leopold
Ignaz should be sent to Madrid. Thus Charles V’s ghost could be laid to rest.
Spain need have no fear of being reduced to a satellite of Vienna. „Besser es falle
dises königreich ad secundogenitum quam ad collateralem vel extranum“ 20. But, of
course, that option soon turned out to be illusory because Ferdinand IV –just
like Balthasar Carlos a few years earlier– suddenly died of the smallpox on 9
July, 1654. For the time being, Leopold Ignatius was Ferdinand’s sole heir. The
whole procedure of an Imperial election had to be repeated; but as he was only
14, many argued it should be postponed for a few years. In the meantime, hopes
for a male heir to the Spanish throne had still not been fulfilled. With the king
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in his mid-fifties, the question was debated who would preside over a regency in
the case of his sudden death – the prince selected for that task would also be in a
pole position to marry the Infanta. (The queen herself was not supposed to be
in the running to head a regency unless she had given birth to a son. If not, she
would simply be sent to a convent, as one of her ladies-in-waiting unkindly
suggested) 21.
Once again, Madrid and Vienna pursued two conflicting strategies.
Ferdinand III still pushed for the Infanta to come to Vienna; as his brother
Leopold Wilhelm was by now well-versed in the ways of Spanish
administration, it was he who should go to Madrid. Lamberg was instructed to
argue “ceaselessly” for Leopold Wilhelm as a regent-in-reserve 22. Philip IV saw
things the other way round. He favoured a clock-wise movement of princes:
Young Leopold Ignaz should come to Madrid; if need be (i.e. if Ferdinand III
was to die suddenly) his uncle Leopold Wilhelm could run for election as
Emperor. Rumours were current that Leopold Wilhelm was unable to father
children 23. Even if true, such an impediment would not matter if he were to be
elected Emperor – a position that could just as well go to his nephew after his
death; whereas a childless couple would create havoc in a hereditary kingdom
like Spain. Admittedly, opinions in Madrid seemed to be divided about that
issue: A majority of ministers, Lamberg reported, favoured Leopold Ignatius
but Peñaranda insisted on Leopold Wilhelm; in the end, though, he was afraid
all these debates might just be pretexts “ut sic regem et nos decipant” 24.
Ferdinand, however, was just as adamant that he would not let his heir leave
the country, either. Before any such move was contemplated, he first had to
succeed to the three crowns of Hungary, Bohemia and the Empire. Auersperg
had in the meantime given up all hope of the Spanish marriage and was looking
around for other options 25. After all, a Spanish bride might even harm Leopold
Ignatius’ chances with the German electors. Insult of insults, he even approved
of an idea floating around to have young Leopold Ignatius marry a Portuguese
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princess, if for no other reason than her expected rich dowry (in monetary
terms, with no reunification intended.) With a few millions in cash, the Vienna
branch could at least start redeeming pawned territories 26. After all, as the
exasperated Lamberg –who was anxious to leave Madrid and tend to his career
back home– put it at the beginning of 1656: He had found it necessary to
remind the Spaniards that these days it was they who were in need of assistance,
not the other way round: “daß wir heutigen tages nit ihre, sondern sie unsere hülff
vonnöthen hätten” 27. 
DESPERATE COUNSELS?
Indeed, over the last two years, the strategic outlook had darkened
considerably. The euphoric days of the reconquista of 1652 had ended. The
death of Ferdinand IV in the summer of 1654 coincided with the first military
setback when the siege of Arras had to be raised. In the summer of 1655, both
Habsburg lines found themselves with an additional war on their hands. In the
Baltic, Queen Christina of Sweden had left her crown to Carl X Gustav whose
attack on Poland created fears that the resurgence of the Swedish war machine
might have a spill-over effect on Germany, too 28. In the Atlantic, Cromwell set
his “Western Design” into motion: If Jamaica seemed a consolation prize;
Blake’s ships hunting for the silver fleet were more than a nuisance. Moreover,
the Fronde had finally been defeated. As a result the tide of war in Flanders
fields turned once more in France’s favour. In Italy, Mazarin’s newly acquired
in-laws, the Modena dynasty, turned on the Spanish and joined the former
Spanish general, Thomas of Savoy, in attacking Milan 29. For the first time
since 1648, Spain actually needed help.
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But the diplomatic channels between Madrid and Vienna had almost dried
up. After a brief reconciliation 30, Castel Rodrigo and Auersperg were again at
daggers drawn. When Castel-Rodrigo delivered his king’s appeal for help on 5
September 1655, he seems to have done so in a notably undiplomatic fashion 31.
Soon after, Leopold Wilhelm grew tired of leading an under-supplied army and
resigned the governorship of the Netherlands – even though Philip IV seemed
willing to listen to his complaints and replace his unloved second-in-command
Fuensaldaña 32. In terms of both regency and/or marriage, Leopold Wilhelm
was now definitely out of the running; his controversial advisor Count Johann
Adolf Schwarzenberg provided an ideal scapegoat for the failings of his master.
In Madrid, as Lamberg put it, Schwarzenberg’s name was written “im catalogo
librorum prohibitendo prima classis” 33. Even if people in Vienna commiserated
with Leopold Wilhelm’s predicament they admitted he had chosen a most
inopportune moment to resign 34. Relations between Madrid and Vienna had
reached a nadir. The two Empires seemed to be drifting apart.
Yet, all was not yet lost. Auersperg tried to establish a direct link with Haro
behind Castel-Rodrigo’s back and remove the friend-turned-enemy from
Vienna altogether. In late 1655 he sent Colonel Jacinto de Vera, a Spanish
veteran of the Thirty Years War in Germany (and of Rocroi 35), on a secret
mission to Madrid. Vera admitted that relations between the two courts had
cooled off recently, movingly described the Emperor’s plight and emphasized
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that the renewed dangers facing the Casa d’Austria called for united action 36.
Haro granted Auersperg’s wish and agreed to Castel-Rodrigo’s recall. As a quid
pro quo, when de Vera returned to Vienna in the summer of 1656, Auersperg
was willing to grant the Spanish wish for military help. The Emperor was not
going to declare war on France but he was willing to fight France’s Italian allies
– in return for Spanish subsidies, as usual. Auersperg explained to the sceptical
nuntio: If the disloyal Duke of Modena had attacked the Netherlands, he could
have done so with impunity, as the Burgundian Circle had been explicitly
declared off-limits by the Treaty of Münster. But Italy was a different matter.
It belonged to the Empire – and the Emperor was entitled, nay obliged to support
his vassals if they needed help. If people had become accustomed to treat the
Emperor as a nonentity they would soon be disillusioned. “Siamo vivi”, he added
threateningly 37. 
There was a subtext to the Vienna initiative: Even if the news had probably
not yet reached Auersperg at the time he authorized the expedition to
Lombardy, reports soon spread about Lionne’s visit to Madrid. At first,
Lamberg had suspected the mysterious guest at the Buen Retiro might be the
Duke of York (the future James II) 38. But in November, at the latest, a letter
reached Madrid from the Emperor complaining about the peace negotiations
behind his back 39. Even if they were in two minds about openly entering the
war again, statesmen in Vienna were not at all in favour of a Franco-Spanish
peace – as they expected the French to throw their forces against Germany in
such a case, and subject the Empire to another two-pronged attack, together
with Sweden. Such peace negotiations also raised the spectre of the infanta
Maria Teresa pawned to France; those were the “desperate counsels” Vienna
feared. Auersperg’s controversial offer of an auxiliary army for Milan clearly
contained a bid to corner the Spanish marriage market, after all.
1432
Lothar Höbelt
36     AGS, Estado, leg. 2363, 6 Nov. 1655. I am grateful to Alistair Malcolm for sending
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37     ASV, Germania 157, fol. 389, 395 (23 Sept. 1656).
38     OÖLA, Steyr 1226/220, Lamberg to Auersperg, 12 July 1656; D. SERE: La Paix des
Pyrennes. Vingt-quatre ans de negociations entre la France et l’Espagne (1635-1659), Paris
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39     OÖLA, Steyr 1226/255, Lamberg to Auersperg, 29 Nov. 1656.
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Controversial it was. Ministers in Vienna had always been afraid their Spanish
counterparts wanted to sabotage the family reunion; Auersperg’s decision made
it obvious there were different opinions in Vienna, too. Leopold Ignatius’
mayordomo Count Johann Ferdinand Portia and Imperial Vice-Chancellor
Count Ferdinand Kurz, the man in charge of relations with the Empire, strongly
disagreed with Auersperg’s strategy. They held Auersperg would provoke France
without materially helping Spain. Instead, the Emperor would do better to
concentrate on Poland that had been overrun by the Swedes in 1655, an event
that was even then likened to the deluge (“potop” in Polish) 40. Portia propagated
a domino-theory: Once Poland went down, the Emperor’s hereditary lands
would be next. However, if the House of Austria helped to save Poland she might
be rewarded with the Polish crown – after all, that was another elective office,
with no obvious contender in sight, since the last Vasa king Jan Kasimir –a
former priest married to his brother’s middle-aged widow– was without an heir
and unlikely to produce one. When in the autumn of 1656, a mutiny broke out
among a regiment destined to cross the Alps, his Majesty’s most loyal opposition
greeted the news in surprisingly gleeful terms – as a sign of divine guidance
preventing Austria from starting a war in the wrong direction 41.
Interestingly enough, to give a complicated story another twist, Spain did
not regard the Polish bait as a diversion from the real problems of the Casa
d’Austria. Both Haro and Peñaranda, in fact, encouraged the Emperor to start
a war on two fronts at the same time 42. Maybe they were driven by the hope
that in such a case the Dutch and the Danish could be persuaded to join the
war effort. If that were the case, the premature case of “mourir pour Danzig”
might open a backdoor for the Empire to re-enter the war in the West, too –
only this time with the Dutch bankrolling the Habsburgs rather than their
enemies. However, both Auersperg and Ferdinand III were unenthusiastic
about the Polish option. They just wanted to prevent Poland from surrendering
and thus freeing Swedish troops for operations elsewhere. That is why they did
their best to persuade the Russians (and their Cossack or Tartar allies) to switch
sides and help Poland, but did not want to commit themselves to fight. As so
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40     OÖLA, Steyr 1225/165, Lamberg to Portia, 10 November 1655.
41     L. HÖBELT: Ferdinand III..., op. cit., p. 398.
42     OÖLA, Steyr 1226/239 & 298, Lamberg to Auersperg, 27 Sept. 1656, 17 Jan. 1657;
1229/380, Lamberg to Ferdinand III, 6 Sept. 1656.
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often in 17th century warfare, not confrontation, but diversion of the enemy’s
resources was the name of the game.
In the meantime, Auersperg’s gamble had succeeded only too well. The
marriage question resurfaced with a vengeance, triggered by two non-events in
the late summer of 1656: On the one hand, Lionne’s negotiations in Madrid did
not produce any tangible results; on the other hand, Queen Maria Ana did not
turn out to be pregnant, as had been hoped. As a result, almost immediately
after Lionne’s departure Philipp IV played his last card: Leopold Ignatius
should come to Madrid – but this time not just as a regent-in-reserve but
clearly as the infanta’s husband. That was not just an offer but an ultimatum.
He would brook no delay. If Vienna rejected the deal, the Infanta would be
married elsewhere. The looming threat was that if the Vienna court tried any
delaying tactics, the Spanish would immediately send for the Duke of Savoy –
thus buying out at least one enemy and stabilizing the Italian front 43. 
Lamberg had reported this bombshell message as early as 20 September
1656 44. Rumours about the plan spread in Vienna around the turn of the year;
but Philipp’s official letter to Ferdinand III only arrived in Vienna in late
March, 1657 45. Faced with such a categorical proposal, even the sceptics
among the Portia and Kurz faction held that such an offer simply could not be
rejected. It was not advisable to watch passively as all these kingdoms and lands
were transferred to a foreign dynasty („gar nit rathsamb zuzusehen, wie dise
königreiche und länder in ein frebdes hauß transferirt werden sollen“). It would not
do to risk certain gains of hereditary kingdoms for the uncertain prospects of
elective crowns („gewisse nit wegen des ungewissen auslassen“) 46.
Once again, death intervened. On 2 April 1657, Ferdinand III died after a
brief illness. As a sort of divine compensation, his daughter Maria Ana turned
out to be pregnant again – in December she actually gave birth to a son, Philip
Prosper. In the meantime, plans actually went ahead for Ferdinand II’s heir
Leopold Ignatius to go to Spain. Portia was the new guiding spirit at Court
where he succeeded in playing off the pro-Spanish Auersperg against the anti-
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43     OÖLA, Steyr 1226/295, Lamberg to Auersperg, 7 Feb. 1657.
44     OÖLA, Steyr 1226/237, Lamberg to Auersperg, 20 Sept. 1656.
45     HHStA, Spanien, Hofkorrespondenz 6, folder 3, fol. 78-9, Philip IV to Ferdinand
III, 22 December, 1656; OÖLA, Steyr 1225/212, Lamberg to Portia, 18 December 1656.
46     OÖLA, Steyr 1225/249, Portia to Lamberg, 24 Jan. 1657.
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Spanish Schwarzenberg. Portia would have preferred to send another archduke
to what he termed a “foreign continent” but if Madrid insisted on Leopold
Ignatius as the only way of saving the Spanish inheritance from falling into the
wrong hands, he would advise his master to comply with his uncle’s wishes. If
one had to choose, Portia was even willing to have Spain rather than the crown
of the Holy Roman Empire: It was “besser die römische cron gehen zu lassen als
das haus zu zertrümmern” 47. But then Madrid had changed its mind after
Ferdinand’s death. It was Spain that all of a sudden followed a “Germany First”
policy and gave priority to the Empire. After all, the support of the Viennese
cousins only seemed worthwhile if rulers in Vienna retained some authority
over the Rhineland that provided a hinterland for the Spanish Netherlands and
a corridor to Italy, as Peñaranda had always emphasized 48. 
However, winning the contest for the Imperial crown meant re-affirming
Leopold’s vows of chastity – in military terms, as he had to repeat the promise
not to help Spain; in another sense, too, because as the military situation
deteriorated in the summer of 1658, Philipp IV started to have second thoughts
about offering the hand of the Infanta to him. Maria Teresa’s marriage to Louis
XIV was the prize to be paid for a tolerable peace with France 49. As Philipp did
have a male heir, by now, this was a risk he was willing to take (maybe also a
prize worth less, as the French argued). France in return made an offer rather
similar to the clauses imposed on the Emperor at Münster; she promised not to
help Portugal any longer. In the end, Leopold Ignatius, by now Emperor
Leopold I, still got his Spanish bride in 1665 50, but it turned out to be his niece
Margarita Teresa, rather than her elder sister who was destined for the less than
brilliant role as consort of the Sun King. 
The two main branches of the Casa d’Austria certainly did enjoy a ‘special
relationship’, with all their ups and downs. In general, if the going was good,
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47     OÖLA, Steyr 1225/292, Portia to Lamberg, 11 July 1657.
48     Correspondencia Diplomática de los Plenipotenciarios españoles en el Congreso de
Münster 1643 a 1648 (= CODOIN 84), Madrid 1885, p. 245, 261.
49     D. SERE: La Paix des Pyrennes..., op. cit., 313 ff.
50     Z. RÖHSNER, „Die Reise des Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach nach Madrid
1665“, in G. BRETTNER-MESSLER et alii (eds.): Von Ferdinand III. bis Jörg Haider. Festschrift
für Lothar Höbelt zum 50. Geburtstag, Vienna 2006, pp. 37-48; A. F. PRIBRAM: „Die Heirat
Kaiser Leopolds I. mit Margarethe Theresia von Spanien“, in Archiv für österreichische
Geschichte 77 (1891), pp. 319-375. 
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both branches were tempted to pursue a fairly independent course and follow a
policy of “fara da se”; if disaster threatened, solidarity might be endangered as
“sauve qui peut” became the motto. But in the grey area in between those two
extremes, mutual assistance, “union”, seemed the obvious solution to overcome
any difficulties. Even when extra adventures beckoned in the East, the Court of
Vienna never lost sight of the main chance, “the inheritance of half the world” 51.
To prevent that inheritance from slipping through their fingers, the German
Habsburgs had even been prepared to re-enter the war in 1656. To use a variation
of Henri IV’s famous slogan, their conviction could be summed up: “Madrid vaut
bien une guerre”. (And Madrid of course included Mexico and Milan and Manila,
too.) Even if Leopold I in the beginning maybe seemed less wedded to that
concept than his father, in the long run, even he, except for a few years around
1670, did not flinch from that prospect. 
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